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Organization of Joint Forces: Componency Doctrine for the Operational Commander Introduction
Today's operational environment is complex, fluid, rapidly changing and wedded, for good or bad, to an increasing dependence on technological innovations involving information, communications, space, mobility and firepower. A major challenge for the operational commander is the efficient and effective use of the forces and resources at his disposal. In organizing his capabilities, he either presents himself with a tailored, integrated and flexible combat team or saddles himself with an inflexible, disjointed and ineffective collection of disparate units.
How does the operational commander arrive at a decision on the organization of his forces in the face of this lethal and complex environment? To what resource does he look to get the guidance, examples and general principles that can be applied to the force allocated him by the CINC?
There are three primary sources I will elaborate on in this paper: personal experience, outside recommendations and guidance, and institutionally recognized and promulgated doctrine. Of these, doctrine should be the clearest and most comprehensive, arising as it does from a development process incorporating the combined contributions of the U.S. military establishment.
Unfortunately, joint doctrine is very incomplete when it comes to force organization. Prospective Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) have to rely on the other two sources to help them in organizing their force to best meet the needs of the situation they have been tasked to resolve. I will discuss this deficiency, addressing viewpoints expressed by selected Services, regional CINCs, various supporting commands and joint doctrinal publications, and close with my recommended solutiona new joint doctrine publication comprehensively addressing the subject of componency.
The Playing Field

"No one starts a war -or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so -without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.'
A So states Clausewitz in discussing war planning. Clausewitz was specifically referring to political purpose and operational objective, but I think the statement is also valid in discussing all aspects the operational commander must attend to in planning for war. Unlike Clausewitz in his time, we have to be concerned with the employment of extremely complex and lethal joint and combined forces in an environment that is highly fluid and fast-paced. The commander who fails to take into account how his forces are organized does so unadvisedly and at great risk of making the difficult task of warfare that much harder. Previously, the battlefield could be fairly well divided into maritime and land mediums. True, one was used to transition to the other and they certainly relied on each other in the sustainment of forces but it is a modern condition that has them so intimately linked together in the actual conduct of combat operations. With the advent of air and space warfare, the rise of the aircraft carrier, submarine, and precision guided munitions delivered from a variety of platforms; multidimensional, multispectral and transmedium warfare has become the norm. Forces arrive via land, air, and sea; fires are delivered from ground, maritime, aerial and space based platforms; information is derived from any number of sources through an infinite variety of means; and the battle easily flows throughout the various mediums. How the Operational Commander organizes his forces for combat at the outset can well determine how easily he is able to adjust to a rapidly changing and increasingly complex battlefield, and how effective his forces will be against the opposition, whether it is symmetric or asymmetric. In fact, the likelihood of an asymmetrical threat increases in direct proportion to our technological advances relative to our potential rivals. This makes even more important the proper organization of joint forces to maximize tactical and operational flexibility. does not restrict the JFC in the organization and employment offerees as the conditions, and his best judgment, warrant.
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The JFC is specifically charged with the responsibility to accomplish the assigned mission and is given the freedom to organize his forces in whatever manner he feels best to do just that. That being said, it is still the job of joint doctrine to provide the commander with a set of tools he can use to go about his job. Where the "tool box" is lacking, the commander must improvise with his own wit and wisdom, the experience brought about by training, and the recommendations and guidance from seniors and subordinates. Herein lies the problem with componency. While Joint Pubs do define it, they do little to expand on the related concepts in a manner useful to the commander. It naturally follows that if the JFC is lacking in joint doctrinal guidance, so too are the force providers who are tasked with training the forces they provide, and the personnel who will assume staff and subordinate command positions. Lacking a unified approach, each Service and training agency has had to rely on self-developed training standards and criteria that will, by their very nature, differ from each other -thus bringing together forces and commanders who have different perceptions of their roles, responsibilities and operational considerations.
Componency and the Joint Perspective
Before moving on to how the Services, corresponding doctrinal commands and selected CINCs have approached this matter, it would be best to review the extent to which componency is relatively explicit in stating that special operations forces will be organized as a functional component and each of the pubs indicates that a JFACC will usually be employed.
Componency -Outside the Box
As alluded to above, the potential does exist for functional components other than those already described. As defined, the operational commander can organize a functional component to address a specific function or type of operation, when the JFC has to concentrate his attention on the larger battle, or when he lacks the required expertise to adequately address the specific area or function in question. A better approach would be to expand this scope to include the use or 12 The cells discovered that, lacking experience with the operational concepts, it was extremely difficult to fight the force using the I do not think it is realistic to expect a joint doctrine publication to be able to address the myriad issues involved in componency and its relation to operational warfare. I also do not think it is possible to identify and address all of the possible functions a JFC might need to deal with on the battlefield, and whether those functions will simply be subordinate functions of an existing component or worthy of development into a functional component in and of themselves. But, to adequately prepare joint forces and provide the operational JFC a document to which he can refer for guidance, suggestions, and recommendations, a joint publication addressing componency in detail would be of great assistance. A portion of the document dealing with issues common to all components, especially functional components, would provide the JFC something to orient him in organizing his force. Additionally, the Services could use it in training prospective JFCs and the forces to be provided to the combatant commanders.
Componency in Operation
During Operation JUST CAUSE, the joint task force put together to accomplish the assigned mission was organized by subordinate task force, broken out primarily by Service and given various objectives within the context of the overall operation. With the vast majority of the forces to be used (13,000 troops already in Panama), the Army was given the lead role; LtGen Stiner of the XVIII Airborne Corps designated Commander, JTF South. In developing his OPLAN 90-2, he employed nearly 22,000 Army troops, 3400 Airmen, 900 Marines, and over 700 Sailors. Each was used as a separate task force and assigned missions corresponding to its capabilities. The Air
Force provided support to the operation as a whole and special forces (Seals, Rangers, etc.) were grouped under MGen Downing as COMJSOTF. 13 The operation was marked by simplicity of the operations order, a clear chain of command and superior cooperation among the various Services.
This was a direct result of implementation of the reforms outlined in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, among which were clear definition of joint force commander authority, consolidation of warfighting powers in the CINCs and simplification of chains of command. 14 Without specifically reporting so, the force planners employed Service components to maximize the capabilities of each while minimizing the coordination problems that arise when forces are mixed. These forces were then separated by distance and mission. A functional component was organized and employed through the consolidation of special operations forces under a single commander. Here, a clear understanding of the value of using Service components to maximize the combat 
Conclusion
To briefly restate the primary conclusions I have drawn in this study: 1) a comprehensive treatment of componency is lacking in joint doctrine; 2) JFCs would be greatly assisted in force organization by a joint doctrine publication that addresses componency in detail; 3) guidance on the formation and use of functional components, specifically, should be expanded to address innovative force employment and emerging warfare concepts; and 4) such doctrine should capture the "insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience" -in other words, lessons learned. Just as a senior commander is responsible for supporting the forces he employs, so too is joint doctrine responsible for providing support to the commander who looks to it for guidance. The organization of forces being of critical importance in the successful conduct of operations, it is essential that joint doctrine address the matter in detail. It is only by educating and training Joint
Force Commanders in peacetime that we will ensure talented and capable forces are ready for times of war. A joint publication on componency is needed now and should be pursued immediately to better support operational commanders tasked with organizing and employing joint forces in the complex battle environments of today and the future.
